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1. East Asian countries (especially China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, 
Taiwan and Malaysia) have managed to suppress and ‘live with’ Covid-19 more 
effectively than advanced Western countries (especially the United States, Canada 
and Europe’s most developed countries (the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Sweden, 
Belgium, France, and Germany) which have witnessed cycles of painful lockdowns, 
re-openings, and re-escalations. This has invited commentary on East Asian 
pandemic management strategies and their transferability to the OECD world.  
2. China’s particular politico-economic-institutional model has played a key role in its 
successful suppression of Covid-19 and as such its lessons cannot be transferred to 
inform the pandemic management strategies of advanced Western liberal capitalist 
democratic states. But this observation is itself insightful. The Chinese case points to 
a central challenge facing Western countries: how best to reconcile stringent public 
restrictions and to ensure public compliance whilst protecting and valorising liberal 
democratic values. Western governments might usefully develop a social contract 
and set of governance mechanisms and policy practices to enable temporary 
restrictive measures to gain a social license and be consequential. We refer to this as 
a pandemic social contract. 
3. The Chinese case also fields three specific ‘takeaways’ of general interest. 
a) The rapid production and circulation of intelligence and data on the uneven 
impacts of Covid-19 on places, sectors and social groups is vital to underpin 
the allocation of effort and efficient uses of resources. 
b) The pandemic has triggered a technological jolt – accelerating the innovation 
and adoption of digital technologies and infrastructure. A post-pandemic stock 
take of the meaning and implications of this digital jolt for particular places 
needs now to inform the development of local digital strategies. 
c) In China, the idea of ‘build back better’ has translated into the concept of high-
quality growth. China’s fusion of a growth agenda with a mission to build 
sustainable and resilient economies and communities might usefully inform 
and be informed by Western efforts to do likewise. 
 
1. Introduction  
At a time when many OECD countries 
have struggled to ‘live with Covid-19’ and 
have witnessed an endless cycle of 
painful lockdowns, re-openings, and 
surging cases and deaths, East Asian 
countries (in particular China, Japan, 
South Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan 
and Malaysia) have seemingly managed 
to suppress Covid-19, restore a sense of 
normalcy and avoid a significant economic 
aftershock and recession. Whilst initially at 
the epicentre of the pandemic, China in 
particular has observed no major 
increases in case numbers or deaths 
(localised flare-ups aside) since the initial 
outbreak. It has avoided successive and 
painful lockdowns and aborted re-
openings and has presided over a year of 
ongoing economic growth. There is no 
simple way of making sense of the East 
Asian encounter with Covid-19, not least 
given that the countries straddling this 
region encompass a wide range of 
politico-economic-institution models. It 
also seems glib to assert the possible 
existence of a blanket ‘Asian’ cultural 
factor. But can any lessons be learned?   
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Figure 1. Lockdown and reopening in China 
 
(Source: National Health Commission, 2020-2021)
Reflecting on China’s experience of 
COVID-19 over the last twelve months, 
and conscious of the specificities of 
China’s politico-economic-institutional 
model, this policy brief attempts to take 
stock of the wider learning which might be 
culled from the Chinese case. It argues 
that China’s centralized political system, 
distributed political infrastructure and 
capacity to effect change at grass roots 
level in every corner of the country have 
combined to enable a speedy and 
successful suppression of Covid-19. As 
such, it is questionable if China’s 
approach could ever be replicated or 
emulated in Western capitalist 
democracies wedded to a liberal politico-
economic-institutional model. But this 
dissonance does point to an important 
truth: liberal democracies might usefully 
benefit from a new pandemic social 
contract comprising strictly temporary and 
regulated innovative governance regimes 
and methods for reconciling liberal 
freedoms and the need for public 
compliance. Beyond this essential insight, 
we also suggest that the Chinese example 
calls further attention to the importance of 
what we call fast data, technological jolts 
and quality growth. 
2. Lockdown and Reopening in 
China 
Whether, when and how to lockdown and 
reopen in response to a pandemic is not 
an exact science (Hickson, 2020). 
However, China’s experience suggests 
that acting quickly, comprehensively and 
strictly can be decisive. Following a visit 
by a team of public health experts to 
Wuhan City in January 2020, the Chinese 
government decided to comprehensively 
lockdown the city and seal its borders. 
Immediately, all provinces then switched 
to China’s ‘Level 1’ public health 
emergency response mode. All industries, 
businesses, and schools were closed. 
Public gatherings and social and 
recreational activities were restricted.  
That lockdown measures were taken two 
days before the eve of the Chinese New 
Year signalled the intent of the 
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government to make difficult decisions 
and to prioritise public health. Dependent 
upon local circumstances, the country was 
then reopened on a phased basis. 
Caution, vigilance and uncompromising 
prioritisation of pandemic suppression was 
applied to walk provinces through a tiered 
relaxation of restrictions (Figure 1). When 
Wuhan reopened on 8 April after a 76-day 
lockdown, confidence was incrementally 
restored. When the country passed the 
major test of the travel peak during the 1 
May International Labour Day holiday, 
lockdown measures were relaxed to near 
normalcy across the country.   
Since May 2020, there have been 
localised flare-ups but these fires have 
been put out immediately through limited 
local lockdowns and reopenings based on 
speedy and accurate testing, tracing and 
isolating of potential patients. For 
example, city-wide nucleic testing of 11 
million residents in Qingdao was 
completed within five days in October, 
identifying a total 13 confirmed cases.  
The big and sudden pause in everyday life 
implemented nationwide from late January 
to early February 2020, although 
preventing the spread of coronavirus, 
unsurprisingly led to a sharp decline in 
economic activity (Figure 2). China’s GDP 
growth rate fell to -6.8% in quarter 1 2020, 
the first negative growth recorded since 
1992 and the poorest economic result 
recorded since 1978 (National Institution 
for Finance & Development, 2020). Some 
economic sectors have been more 
resilient than others. Whilst the catering 
sector saw a 41.9% fall in income, online 
services and ICT witnessed year-on-year 
growth of 14% in turnover (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2021b). 
Electronic goods and medicine saw 
considerable growth, whilst sales of other 
consumer goods contracted. The urban  




(Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2020-2021)
 
Policy Briefing 036             Page 5 
unemployment rate1 reached 6.2% 
nationally in February 2020, and the 
number of rural migrant workers 
decreased by 4.96 million in the first half 
of 2020 year-on-year (United Nations 
China, 2020). Small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) were hardest hit. The 
fragile global economy has led to 
uncertainty in global supply chains and 
export-oriented regions and cities have 
proactively shifted to a new strategy of 
Double Circulation, which has aimed to 
stimulate both the domestic and 
international market. Total GDP growth for 
China in 2020 is estimated at 2.3%, and 
compares favourably with advanced 
economies (-4.9%) and world as a whole 
(-3.5%) (IMF, 2021). 
3. Reopening Strategies and 
Measures 
According to the World Health 
Organization’s (WHO) in a joint mission on 
COVID-19: “China has rolled out perhaps 
the most ambitious, agile and aggressive 
disease containment effort in history” 
(WHO, 2020). But suppression of the virus 
and reopening of the economy have not 
been construed as necessarily 
antagonistic. A package of intensive 
policies has been introduced by the 
national government, accompanied with 
local measures, to ensure that ongoing 
disease containment initiatives and 
economic activities are aligned. These can 
be categorised into five domains: place, 
business, livelihood, public health, and 
people, covering almost all sectors of work 
and life (Figure 3). 
Cities have been classified according to 
their level of risk based on daily 
monitoring of cases.  Movement in and out 
of cities at risk has been tracked with the 
                                               
1 Measured according to the International Labour Organization standard definition of people above 16 
without a job who have been actively seeking work within the last three months and are available to 
start work within the next two weeks. 
 
aid of technology. Within cities, the level of 
permitted mobility is proscribed by 
purpose, with different rules for leisure, 
work, education etc. Financial subsidies or 
waiving of business costs have been 
provided to businesses, with special 
attention given to small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) and self-employed 
groups. To ensure the goal of 
“employment stabilisation”, platform-based 
employment (e.g. Didi, Taobao, Airbnb) 
and the street-vendor economy (the so-
called “Ditan Economy”) was allowed and 
encouraged by national government. In 
the run-up to this year’s Spring Festival, 
when substantial numbers of workers 
travel back to their home towns, incentives 
were provided to encourage employees to 
stay in the cities where they work, with the 
aim of restricting movement. These 
incentives include increased overtime pay, 
free food and accommodation, and tickets 
to local scenic spots (China Daily, 2021). 
Implementation of agreed policies at all 
levels has been key. China’s political 
system has produced high levels of public 
compliance, the efficient allocation of 
resources, and the undertaking of large 
and labour intensive projects at short 
notice. In addition, the commitment of 
local authorities, enterprises and 
individuals to collective action has been 
crucial (Kupferschmidt et al., 2020). The 
responsibility for epidemic control is not 
only passed down through the national-
local government system, but also directly 
assigned to each enterprise under local 
management. Staff health information and 
supplies must be in place and examined 
before any work can be resumed. Some 
large-scale companies and factories have 
even booked chartered flights and trains 
to enable their employees to restart work 
earlier, in some cases, with costs shared 
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Figure 3. Policies and measures to support resumption of work amid the outbreak (February  
- August 2020) 
 
* Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism: A multi-ministerial coordination work mechanism platform 
at the central government level in response to the outbreak of the COVID-19 in early 2020. 
(Source: The State Council of China, 2020)
with local authorities eager for a quick 
recovery. At the community level, 
community workers, property managers, 
public servants, and volunteers have been 
assigned to daily epidemic control and 
livelihood support. 
With cumulative efforts and experience, a 
maturing set of measures and procedures 
for tracking, monitoring, reporting and 
prevention of imported and internal 
rebound cases of coronavirus have taken 
shape. This has enabled the effective 
restriction of several new outbreaks, such 
as that experienced at a seafood market 
in Beijing.  
4. New Opportunities and 
Transitions 
Public and private sectors in China have 
also treated the crisis as a turning point for 
transition towards “high-quality growth”. In 
the West, a similar debate is being had 
over how best to build back better, go 
forward, and emerge stronger from Covid-
19. Whilst these debates differ in their 
origins and trajectory, there is scope to 
consider both together. How might 
economic recovery lead to fairer and more 
sustainable and resilient cities?  
 
Area Main Content Time Policy Released by
17-Feb
Guidelines on Taking Science-based, Targeted, Region-specific,
and Tiered Measures for COVID-19 Prevention and Control
21-Feb
Guidelines on COVID-19 Prevention and Control Measures for
Resumption of Work
6-Apr
Notice on Prevention and Control Measures for Key Locations,
Organizations and Population Groups
7-Apr
Guidelines on COVID-19 Prevention and Control Measures for
Localities at Different Risk Levels to Resume Work
1. Strengthen financial support
2. Improve government service (skill training,
streamline administrative process),
3. Reduce enterprise cost (rent, tax etc.)
12-Feb
Notice on Strengthening Mayor Responsibility System on ‘
Vegetable Basket’ to Ensure Stable Production and Supply of
Agricultural Products
State Council
Joint Prevention and Control
Mechanism
18-Mar Guidelines on Current Spring Production Central Leading Group for Novel
Coronavirus Prevention and Control
1. Instantly disclosure information to public;
2. Dynamically adjust risk level;
3. Constantly improve emergency plan; 6-Apr Manual for Management of Asymptomatic Virus Carriers
4. Strengthen monitoring among key areas
(e.g. boarder area of northeast region,
Beijing), key population (asymptomatic virus
carriers) and key sites (market).
7-May
Guidelines on Conducting COVID-19 Prevention and Control on an
Ongoing Basis
5. Capacity building of mass Covid testing 31-Aug
Notice on the Issuance of a Work Plan to Further Enhance the
Novel Coronavirus Nucleic Acid Detection Capability
10-Feb
Measures to Improve the Working Condition Physical and Mental
Health of Front-line Medical Personnel
National Health Commission, Ministry
of Human Resource and Social
Security, Ministry of Finance
3-Mar
Notice on the Implementation of Care Measures for Front-line
Urban and Rural Community Workers in Disease Prevention and
Control
6-Mar
Notice on Further Ensuring the Welfare of Poverty Population
During the Disease Prevention and Control Period
14-Mar
Working Plan for Protecting Children Without Guardianship
Due to COVID-19
State Council
Joint Prevention and Control
Mechanism
State Council




Decision on Implementation of Measures to Stabilize
Employment by Offsetting the Impact of COVID-19
*More details could be found in UNDP Assessment Report on
Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on Chinese Enterprises.
State Council
Livelihood Safe spring production and efficient food
supply: logistics support and new platforms
26-Mar
Announcement on the Temporary Suspension of Entry by
Foreign Nationals Holding Valid Chinese Visas or Residence
Permits
1. Region-specific, place-targeted and tiered
measures to different districts; 2. Refined
measures for key locations (indoor recreation
and leisure place, public vehicle etc.),
organizations (welfare home, prisons and
hospital etc.) and population groups (elderly,
children, pregnant women, students etc.)
Public
Health
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National
Immigration Administration
Central Leading Group for Novel
Coronavirus Prevention and Control
1. Ensure welfare of vulnerable groups (elderly,
children, pregnant women, poverty population
and children without guardianship)
2. Enhance working environment quality,
ensure physical and mental health, and
provide appropriate subsidies and recognition




Joint Prevention and Control
Mechanism
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It is clear that Covid-19 has precipitated a 
watershed moment in the unfolding 
relationship between society and 
technology, a moment when technological 
rupture will lead to epochal shifts in the 
ways in which human beings live and 
work. There arises an increasingly 
influential claim that a fourth industrial 
revolution (also known as a cyber-physical 
revolution, Industry 4.0 (IR4), and/or 
Society 5.0) is imminent (if not already 
here), catalysed by the new ‘horizontal’ 
(generic and economy wide) technologies 
of artificial intelligence, digital connectivity, 
and big data. A so-called ‘big mind’ 
combining machine and human 
intelligence, is poised to dramatically scale 
the ability of humanity to solve the grand 
economic, social and environmental 
challenges of the twenty first century.   
In China, the Covid-19 technological jolt is 
informing emerging approaches to build 
new infrastructure, birthing new 
businesses and brokering new currencies. 
New Infrastructure 
In formulating the country’s strategic 
development plan for the next five years, 
growth driven by physical capital 
investment is expected to be gradually 
replaced by investment in innovation 
knowledge and social capital (Hepburn et 
al., 2020). New forms of digital 
infrastructure have accelerated to become 
one of the most prevalent technology 
trends since the emergence of COVID-19. 
This new infrastructure has already 
successfully enabled epidemic prevention 
and control (e.g. contact tracing, online 
consultation) (Accenture, 2020); and laid a 
solid foundation for shaping new urban life 
and working (e.g. distance learning, online 
working, digital health, smart urban 
governance, smart cars, smart homes). By 
September 2020, almost all Chinese 
provinces had referenced new 
infrastructure construction in their 
Government Work Reports, and 15 have 
actively issued action plans (CCID Think 
Tank, 2020). By the end of 2020, more 
than 30,000 5G outdoor base stations had 
been built in Shanghai (Xinhuanet, 2020). 
New Business 
Empowered by technological advances, 
digitalisation has been embraced to 
improve efficiency and costs of production 
(Hepburn et al., 2020). During the 
pandemic, live broadcasting on online 
platforms by celebrities to promote rural 
agricultural products quickly rose to 
national prominence. In quarter 1 of 2020, 
online agricultural product sales grew by 
as much as 31%, both supporting 
numerous poverty counties and ensuring 
food supply during restricted mobility (JD 
Big Data Research Institute, 2020). Digital 
business has expanded to various types 
of goods and services. Around 500 real 
estate agencies and 23 car brands have 
broadcast their product sales online; 
artists held concerts and museums have 
also made their spring outing activities 
online (Ali Research 2020). The monthly 
active user of the top three online 
platforms (Taobao, TikTok, Snack Video) 
topped 1.4 billion, representing almost the 
total population of China. The 2020 
‘Double Eleven’ (Single’s Day Festival on 
11 November), a carnival for e-commerce 
platforms, has yielded a total sales 
revenue of RMB 498.2 billion, up by 
85.6% as compared to 2019. Further, the 
job market has also witnessed significant 
transitions. Jobs recently released by the 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security have included online learning 
service providers, live-streaming 
salesmen and blockchain engineering 
technicians.  
New Currency  
Important to E-commerce, E-payment 
already has gained momentum and a 
‘digital currency and electronic payment 
(EC/EP), equivalent to paper notes and 
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coins in circulation, is being developed by 
the central bank of China. Adopting 
blockchain technology, it shows great 
potential to be used not only in the fight 
against money laundering, tax evasion 
and fraud (China Daily, 2020), but also 
widely in local governance and livelihood 
projects to further ensure policy effects 
and accurate use of specific funds. Based 
on more pilot testing and with continuous 
improvement in new infrastructure and 
transformation in new business formation, 
it is expected that the scenarios and 
opportunities for using digital currency will 
continue to expand (China Digital 
Currency Research Institute, 2020).  
5. Conclusions and Lessons  
When set into global context, China has 
managed to suppress Covid-19, through a 
single comprehensive and strict national 
lockdown, a multi-level governance 
regime with deep reach into everyday life, 
and a high level of public compliance 
which has enabled the country to reopen 
without a significant second pandemic 
wave. Although lockdowns have huge 
social, economic and political costs, the 
quick and firm response enacted by the 
Chinese government did help to prevent 
the crisis from becoming prolonged. 
Moreover, China’s ability to pour water on 
the flames of local flare ups through rapid 
and local containment and vigorous test, 
track and trace systems, has ensured that 
life has returned to a degree of normalcy 
since spring 2020. The actions taken did 
however rely on high levels of compliance, 
enforced by the state and underpinned by 
Chinese cultural norms. It is questionable 
whether Western liberal states would or 
could emulate the Chinese approach. 
Every politico-economic-institutional 
model must approach pandemic 
management through the lens of its own 
structures and values. For liberal 
democracies, a key challenge to emerge 
from Covid-19 would appear to be 
balancing the protection of rights and 
freedoms while securing a social license 
for restrictions and achieving high levels of 
public compliance. Here we offer the idea 
of the importance in disaster risk 
management of pioneering a new 
emergency and temporary pandemic 
social contract. Beyond this fundamental 
conclusion, we also point to the wider 
significance and learning to accrue from 
China’s embrace of the ideas of fast data, 
technological jolt and quality growth. 
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